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DevelopmentThe aim of this review is to describe the potential relationship between multisensory disintegration and self-
disorders in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Sensory processing impairments affecting multisensory integra-
tion have been demonstrated in schizophrenia. From a developmental perspective multisensory integration is
considered to be crucial for normal self-experience. An impairment of multisensory integration is called ‘percep-
tual incoherence’. We theorize that perceptual incoherencemay evoke incoherent self-experiences including de-
personalization, ambivalence, diminished sense of agency, and ‘loosening of associations’ between thoughts,
feelings and actions that lie within the framework of ‘self-disorders’ as described by Sass and Parnas (2003).
We postulate that subconscious attempts to restore perceptual coherence may induce hallucinations and delu-
sions. Increased insight into mechanisms underlying ‘self-disorders’ may enhance our understanding of schizo-
phrenia, improve recognition of early psychosis, and extend the range of therapeutic possibilities.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
We perceive our environment and ourselves by all our sensory sys-
tems (Critchley et al., 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Angelaki and Cullen,
2008; Craig, 2008; Bermúdez, 2011; Gallese, and Sinigaglia, 2011;
Bremner et al., 2012; Damasio, 2012). The neurobiological process of or-
ganizing and processing sensory information for effective interaction
within the environment is called ‘multisensory integration’, and evolves
duringmaturation (Rochat and Striano, 2002; Lewis and Ramsay, 2004;
Ayres et al., 2005; Bremner, et al., 2012; Ghazanfar, 2012). It is regarded
as crucial for various aspects of normal self-experience: recognition of
own body, actions, imagination, memory, and (emotional) awareness
(Gallagher, 2000; Damasio, 2001; Jeannerod, 2003; Rainville et al.,
2006; Tsakiris et al., 2007; Craig, 2008; Vianna et al., 2009; Bermúdez,
2011; Damasio, 2012; Prebble et al., 2012).
Many impairments affecting multisensory integration have been
demonstrated in schizophrenia (Table 1). We hypothesized that these
sensory deﬁciencies and abnormal self-experiences in schizophrenia
might be connected. The aim of this review is to explore research on
self and self-disorders in schizophrenia from the perspective of. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND licmultisensory integration, in a developmental context. All sensorymodal-
ities, including ‘interoception’ and vestibular sense, are our study objects.
First we will outline the historical context. After specifying the con-
cept of self we will provide a description of self-experience in healthy
individuals from a developmental andmultisensory perspective. Subse-
quently, we describe the relationship between self-disorders and per-
ceptual incoherence and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Finally, we
propose a sensory model as to self-disorders that may lead to psychotic
symptoms, and postulate that subconscious attempts to restore percep-
tual coherence may induce hallucinations and delusions.
2. Method
APubMed literature searchwas performed to address two questions:
Are perceptual incoherence and self-disorders related in schizophrenia spec-
trum disorders? If so, how can we characterize the relationship between
perceptual incoherence, self-disorders and psychotic symptoms?
Our search used the following keywords: schizophrenia, self-
disorders, body image, body awareness, self-awareness, self-other orga-
nization, imagination, olfactory sense, proprioception, vestibular sense,
interoception, haptic sense, sensory integration, sensory processing,
crossmodal, and development. Additional literature was retrieved via
references. There were no limitations regarding year of publication, lan-
guages were limited to English, French, German and Dutch.
3. Historical context
Many prominent psychiatrists have shared the concept that schizo-
phrenia is associatedwith disintegration of self. In Bleuler's terminologyense.
Table 1
An outline of sensory dysfunctions affectingmultisensory integration in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Sensory dysfunctions regarding almost all senses are associatedwith increased
risk for schizophrenia. Sensory deﬁcits have been demonstrated in schizophrenia (Sz), Capgras syndrome (Cpg) andDelusions of Control (DoC), in relatives of schizophrenic patients (Rel),
schizotypic personality (StP), depersonalization disorder (DPD) and self-delusions caused by brain lesions (BL). The only sensory deﬁcit that is protective for schizophrenia is congenital
blindness, which is associated with compensatory strengthening of somatosensory processing.
Senses Sensory deﬁcit Investigated
subjects
Literature
Olfactory sense Deviant olfactory experiences Predictive: Sz,
ps
Cascella et al. (2007), Kwapil et al. (1996)
Olfactory functions, meta-analysis Sz, StP Moberg et al. (in press), Cohen et al. (2012)
Structural impairments olfactory system Sz Turetsky et al (2009), Moberg et al. (in press), Cascella et al. (2007)
Haptic sense Sensitivity and processing Sz, StP, Rel Lenzenweger (2000) Chang and Lenzenweger (2004) Chang and Lenzenweger (2005)
Altered self/other discrimination Sz Blakemore et al. (2000), Silverstein et al. (2012)
Higher susceptibility for Rubber Hand Illusion Sz Thakkar et al. (2011), Peled et al. (2000)
Propriocepsis Impaired sensory processing all cerebral levels BL Feinberg (2009)
Lower processing speed/attenuated beta and
gamma oscillations-proprioceptive info
Sz, StP Arnfred et al. (2006), Arnfred et al. (2010)
Recognition and prediction motor actions Ps, Sz, DoC Ferri et al. (2012), Franck et al. (2001) Frith et al. (2000), Frit (2005), Fourneret et al. (2002),
Jeannerod (2003), Shergill et al. (2005), Silverstein et al. (2012), Synofzik et al. (2010)
Vestibular
sense
Eye tracking abnormalities Sz Jones and Pivik (1985), Levy et al. (2010), Pawlak-Osińska et al. (2000)
Hypo-reactivity and dysfunction Sz, HR-Sz Colbert et al. (1959), Fish and Dixon (1978) Gordon (1979), Levy et al. (1983)
Altered vestibular responses and synchrony Sz, DPD Haghgooie et al. (2009), Ornitz (1970), Sang et al. (2006)
Visuo-vestibular disintegration Sz, Szt Schilder (1933), Pawlak-Osińska et al. (2000)
Caloric vestibular nerve stimulation is
beneﬁcial
Sz, BL Levine et al. (2011), Lopez et al. (2012), Rubens (1985)
Interoception Autonomic abn. & disconnection response DPD, Sz, Cpg Dawson et al., (2010), Lewis et al. (2001), Ellis and Lewis (2001), Roux et al. (2010),
Williams et al. (2007)
Simult. co-activation two evaluative systems Sz Trémeau et al. (2009)
Interoception related to emotion processing Sz, DPD Seth et al. (2011), Wylie (2010)
Pain processing and monitoring Sz Rel Josephus Jitta (2012), Kring and Neale (1996), Potvin and Marchand (2008), Shintani (2010),
Singh et al. (2006)
Audio–visual Hearing or visual dysfunction Higher risk: Sz Butler and Javitt (2005), Butler et al. (2009), Chen et al. (2003), Chen (2011), Coleman et al.
(2009),
Javitt (2009), de Jong et al. (2009), de Gelder et al. (2005)
Congenital blindness is protective for Sz Sz Silverstein et al. (2006), Silverstein et al. (2012)
Visual processing Sz Butler and Javitt (2005)
Auditory processing Sz Micoulaud-Franchi et al. (2012, 2011), Leitman et al. (2008)
Audio–visual processing Sz de Jong et al. (2009), Ross et al. (2007)
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ambivalence, inappropriate or ﬂattened affectivity and autism (Bleuler,
1911; Moskowitz and Heim, 2011). Some psychiatrists linked sensory
dysfunction with disturbance of self in schizophrenia (Pick, 1904;
Schilder, 1933; Blankenburg, 1971; Mahler and McDevitt, 1982).
Schilder (1933) related sensory disintegration to disintegration of the
ego directly, and assigned a special role for the vestibular apparatus.
Various investigators observed disturbance of sensory integration
and vestibular pathology in childhood and adult schizophrenia
(Colbert et al., 1959; Ornitz, 1970; Ayres, 1972; Jorstad et al., 1977;
Fish and Dixon, 1978; Gordon, 1979; Blakeney et al., 1983; Levy et al.,
1983; Jones and Pivik, 1985; Fish and Kendler, 2005). Blankenburg's in-
vestigations led towhat he regarded as the core phenomenon of schizo-
phrenia: “der Verlust der natürliche Selbstverständlichkeit”, literally
translated ‘the loss of natural self-evidence’, in English literature often
referred to as ‘a loss of common sense’ (Blankenburg, 1971; Uhlhaas
and Mishara, 2007).
After the rise of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Dis-
orders (DSM), the inﬂuence of the abstract concept of self and the con-
cept of sensory integration both declined. DSM fulﬁlled a need for
objectivity and scientiﬁc veriﬁcation. Against the grain, phenomenolog-
ical studies continued in Europe (Huber, 1995; Klosterkötter et al., 1997;
Parnas, 1999). Sass and Parnas (2001, 2003) introduced a phenomeno-
logical model, which relates self-disorders to positive and negative
symptoms and disorganisation.
Damasio (2001) offered another perspective: patterns of sensory in-
formation, especially ‘interoception’ (i.e. the sensing of the organism's
interior) lead to awareness of emotions.
By now, phenomenological ideas are welcomed again as a valuable
approach in the area of early detection and prevention of psychosis
(Nelson et al., 2012) and the subject of sensory integration in schizo-
phrenia gains in interest rapidly (Javitt, 2009).4. Development of self
For pragmatic reasons we describe normal sense of self as a feeling of
unitary entity, the “I”, that owns and authors its thoughts, emotions,
body and actions. The development of a sense of self is intertwined
with the developmental abilities to integrate sensory input (Rochat
and Striano, 2002; Lewis and Ramsay, 2004; Rochat, 2011b; Bremner
et al., 2012). Though the environment continuously inﬂuences us, we
are demarcated from it (Kuiper, 1986; Gallagher, 2000; Kircher and
David, 2003). Multisensory input continuously informs us, which is es-
sential for normal self-experience (Gallagher, 2005; Zahavi, 2005;
Craig, 2010; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011; Blanke, 2012; Damasio,
2012). Like our nose is always present in the centre of our visual ﬁeld,
a ‘background composition of multisensory input’, responsible for an ab-
stract awareness of ourselves, is present in every experience we have
(Table 2). This ‘sensory self’ is analogous to phenomenological concepts
as ‘presence’, ‘core self’, ‘minimal self’ or ‘ipseity’ (Sass and Parnas,
2003; Stanghellini, 2004; Gallagher, 2005; Cermolacce et al., 2007;
Bermúdez, 2011; Damasio, 2012).
Normal development of self requires increasing skills to reach agree-
ment between different perspectives of self, in different situations,
without a gross distortion of reality. Neurological and phenomenologi-
cal self-development is intertwined, has analogous hierarchical compo-
sition, and is consistent with developmental milestones.
In the ﬁrst months after birth, information from the inner body and
physical boundaries is dominant (Rochat, 2001; Rochat and Striano,
2002; Feinberg, 2009; Rochat, 2011a,b; Bremner et al., 2012). Newborns
appear to have a sense of being embodied in an environment in which
they have agency (Rochat, 2011a). This minimal self-awareness is
infused with meaning arising from interaction with others (Mahler
and McDevitt, 1982; Aitken and Trevarthen, 1997; Rochat, 2001;
Rochat and Striano, 2002; Rochat, 2011a). In infancy (0–12 months),
Table 2
The senses, their associated functions and contributions to normal experience. Body-centred senses (especially olfaction, haptic and vestibular sense) develop earlier than environment-
oriented senses (a simpliﬁed representation, crossmodal interactions have been omitted).
Sense Associated functions Normal experiences Literature
Olfactory –Digestive behaviour
–Familiarity–unfamiliarity
–Orientation
–Infant emotion regulation
–Attachment & social functioning
–Emotions–Learning–Memories–
imagination
–Many smells are unaware.
–Smells bring forth memories or associations
and inﬂuence emotions.
–Food, family and home environment smell
familiar. Familiar smells cause relaxation
and rapprochement.
–Smelling occurs by inhalation into the body.
Unusual smells cause vigilance/aversive
smells feel intrusive and bring forth strong
self-protective behaviours.
Bremner et al. (2012), La Buissonnière-Ariza
et al. (2012), Damasio (2012), Kivity et al.
(2009), Schaal and Durand (2012),
Stevenson (2010)
Haptic –Perceiving superﬁcial touch
–Perceiving shape and texture
–Demarcation body segments
–Position of body parts
–Physical boundary
–Body image/ownership
–Infant emotion regulation
–Attachment
–My skin encloses my body, forms a boundary
between inner and outer world.
–My inner body is private and cannot diffuse
into the outer world; it is inaccessible from
the outer world.
–Skin sensations mirror my presence, position
and adjacent surroundings.
–Touch inﬂuences relational contacts.
Aspell et al. (2009), Bermúdez (2011),
Bremner et al. (2012), Cole and
Paillard (1995), Duhn (2010), Ernst (2002),
Feinberg (2009), Ferrè (2011), Gallagher
(2005), Hohwy and Paton (2010), Rochat
(2011a, 2011b), Schütz-Bosbach et al. (2009),
Tsakiris et al. (2007, 2011), de Vignemont
et al. (2009)
Vestibular –Coordination eyes & body
movement
–Integration interoception and
exteroception
–Differentiation of active vs. passive
–Orientation in place and person
–Integration actions, cognitive efforts,
autonomous nervous system& limbic
system
Vestibular activity evokes no conscious
sensations
–My body is in balance.
–Gravity pulls me towards the ground.
–I am here, conﬁned to my body.
–Stable unity between ‘me’, my mind, my
body, emotions, actions and environment.
Angelaki and Cullen (2008), Bermúdez (2011),
Blanke and Arzy (2005),
Carmona et al. (2009), Cheyne and Girard
(2009), Ferrè et al. (2011), 2013), Fetsch et al.
(2009), Giummarra et al. (2008), Jáuregui-Renaud
et al. (2008), Lopez et al. (2008, 2010, 2012),
DeAngelis and Angelaki, 2009., Rochat (2011a, 2011b),
Schilder (1933), Sang et al. (2006)
Interoception –Pain perception
–Implicit awareness of inner physical
ﬂuctuations
–Interpersonal attunement
–Embodied simulation
–Self-other discrimination
–Motivation
–Orientation in time
–Damage of my body hurts.
–I'm aware of my and other's emotions.
–I can separate my own from other's emotions.
–I can distinguish reality from dreams, memory
and imagination.
–My actions are largely driven by inner motivation.
–My feelings vary along with actions and events
I go through.
–My body and mind are united.
–Time feels continuous. I am in the present,
between past and future.
Bechara and Naqvi (2004), Buccino and Amore
(2008), Carmona et al. (2009), Craig (2008),
Critchley et al. (2004), Damasio (2012),
Gallese et al. (2007), Gallagher (2005),
Giummarra et al. (2008), Perl (2007),
Potvin and Marchand (2008), Tsakiris et al. (2011)
Proprioception –Motion-perception
–Deep pressure
–Position joints/body parts
–Union of body parts to motor units
–Posture
–Spatial orientation
–Self-other differentiation
–My body is a solid entity.
–Movements strengthen my bodily awareness, but
bodily attention is not needed for everyday actions.
–I am aware of my intentions and execution of
actions, without taking notice of the process.
Bermúdez (2011), Bremner et al. (2012),
Cole and Paillard (1995), Ehrsson et al.
(2005), Ernst and Bülthoff (2004),
Feinberg (2009), Gallagher
(2005), Gallese and Sinigaglia (2011), Giummarra et al.
(2008), Rochat (2011a, 2011b), Tsakiris et al.
(2007, 2011)
Environment orientated:
Auditory & visual
sense
–Exterosensory conﬁrmation of
somatosensory perspective
–I am here, in the centre of my experiential world.
–My body is demarcated from the environment.
–Mybody image resemblesmy features in themirror.
Aspell et al. (2009), Bremner et al. (2012), Damasio (2012),
Ernst and Banks (2002), Gallese and Sinigaglia (2011),
Giummarra et al. (2008), Kernberg et al. (2007)
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portant (Ayres et al., 2005; Feinberg, 2009; Ghazanfar, 2012). Interplay
between visual, auditory and somatosensory information becomes
more dynamical. Between 1 and 6 years of age, modulation of impact
given to vision and proprioception plays a role in ﬁne-tuning of body
representations (Bremner et al., 2012). Observed behaviour of others
is used as a mirror to gain knowledge about self and others (Gallese,
2003). A strong self-evaluating system and sense of self-constancy de-
velops. A child of 21 months is able to recognise himself, i.e. to integrate
different self-perspectives: felt from the inside (ﬁrst person perspec-
tive) and from the other's point of view (third-person perspective)
(Rochat and Striano, 2002; Lewis and Ramsay, 2004; Rochat, 2011b).
Simulation of others' behaviours, including ‘embodied simulation’ (i.e.
a perceptive bond between subject and object), precedes the ability to
think about other persons' thoughts and imagine others' mental experi-
ence (Gallese, 2003). This latter ability is presumed to develop from
5 years of age and contributes to Theory of Mind (TOM, third person
perspective), and the ability to predict other's actions (Rochat, 2001;
Lewis and Ramsay, 2004; Rochat, 2011b; Damasio, 2012). Coherent re-
ality monitoring is not yet achieved at this age (Dehart et al., 2004). Afurther reﬁnement of skills in middle and late childhood (6–12 years)
is associated with optimal sensory integration (Ernst, 2008; Bremner
et al., 2012), increasing sense of self-continuity and sense of agency,
but also for potential false-self behaviour (Dehart et al., 2004; Harter,
2012). Increasing metacognitive understanding and logical reasoning
go along with growing reality-monitoring abilities (Dehart et al.,
2004). In adolescence (10–18 years), cortical remodelling and en-
hanced efﬁciency and ﬁdelity of signal transmission (Tau and
Peterson, 2009) go along with self-differentiation: identity formation,
improving coping strategies, and reality monitoring. As adolescence
progresses, ambivalent facets of self can be united (Dehart et al., 2004;
Harter, 2012).
5. Multisensory integration
‘Multisensory integration’ refers to the integrating process involving
all senses. This process starts with detection of sensory input by
modality-speciﬁc receptors that translate stimuli (light, sound, chemical,
mechanical and temperature) to neural activity. The resulting mental
impression of distal stimuli is perceived as a conﬂuent whole, the
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Within this percept, relations between different modalities change
from moment to moment. For example, selective attention can reduce
sensory integration by inhibiting input from other senses. Similarly, the
level of attention inﬂuences the composition and cohesion between back-
ground and foreground information (Bahrick and Lickliter, 2012;
Laurienti and Hugenschmidt, 2012). Although the input of all sensory
modalities is merged, a differentiation between their sources (f.e. inside
or outside) is necessary for the ability to distinguish between self
and non-self and between imagination and reality (Brébion et al.,
2002; Feinberg, 2009; Ferchiou et al., 2010; Gawęda et al., 2013). Speciﬁc
properties of differentmodalities contribute to a paradoxwithin the self:
both discrimination and unity must be achieved, not only between self
and environment, but also between different facets inside the self
(Table 2).
Discrimination between self and non-self and sense of boundaries is
offered by proprioception and touch (Ramachandran and Hirstein,
1998; Feinberg, 2009; Miyazaki et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2010). Tactile sen-
sations form a continuous “sensory sheet” covering the whole body (de
Vignemont et al., 2009): a pivotal position for giving shape to physical
boundaries.
All senses contribute to a normal sense of self (Table 2). Regarding
the tacit nature and incoherent characteristics of self-disturbances, we
argue that if multisensory integration is affected in self-disorders, prob-
ably nondescript senses with strong integrative effects are involved,
such as vestibular sense and interoception (Angelaki and Cullen, 2008;
Bermúdez, 2011; Lopez et al., 2008; Tsakiris et al., 2011).
‘Interoception’ provides perception of inner movements (‘feeling of
feelings’): the basis for the emotional awareness and representation of
the body fromwithin (Damasio, 2012). It is assumed that interoception
is not only involved in emotional attunement to the environment, but
also in distinction between one's own and the others' emotions
(Bechara and Naqvi, 2004; Critchley et al., 2004; Gallese et al., 2007;
Murata and Ishida, 2007; Buccino and Amore, 2008; Berlucchi and
Aglioti, 2010; Craig, 2010; Bermúdez, 2011; Tsakiris et al., 2011;
Damasio, 2012). Distinction and attunement between self and others
enable engagement in social interactions.
Vestibular signals contribute to most everyday behaviours yet pro-
duce no conscious sensations (Ferrè et al., 2013). The vestibular system
integrates vestibular, body-centred and environment-oriented input.
Vestibular disturbances result in disintegration of sensory input and ex-
treme experiential changes that are distressing and feel weird. The ves-
tibular system occupies a pivotal position at the crossroads between
physical, mental and emotional homeostasis (Angelaki and Cullen,
2008; Lopez et al., 2008; Carmona et al., 2009; Cheyne and Girard,
2009; Bermúdez, 2011).
6. Perceptual incoherence
An impairment of multisensory integration is called ‘perceptual in-
coherence’. Perceptual incoherence can be induced by contradictory
sensory input or extreme imbalance between various types of sensory
input, which result from local or generalized decreased somatosensory
feedback or sensory–motor contradictions to such an extent that infor-
mation cannot be united as one percept. It has been demonstrated that
incoherent sensory information brings forth incoherent experiences.
Perceptual incoherence may occur in non-pathological situations,
such as when we erroneously expect another step on top of the stairs:
the foot sinks through the imagined step. A startling change of forces
in foot, muscles and joints, gravity andmomentum increases risk of fall-
ing (Bakken et al., 2007). A startle response, a sinking feeling in our
stomach as if in a roller coaster, and disorientation occur until we reﬂex-
ively regain our feet and feelings. Other examples: the short moment
we perceive (feel) our train is departing in the wrong direction, until
we realise (see) that – in fact – another train is moving (Ernst and
Bülthoff, 2004). In case of local anaesthesia, incoherence persists untilthe effect of the anaesthetic wears off. In all these cases incoherence is
comprehensible and resolves easily,which considerably attenuates feel-
ings of anxiety and surprise.
To showwhatmechanismsmight be effective in reducing perceptual
incoherence, wewill give some examples, that later onwill be discussed
concerning self-disorders and hallucinatory experiences. Conﬂicting
sensory information is associated with persistent phantom limb sensa-
tions in amputees, e.g. consisting of sensory and motor memories
(Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1998). Also, sensory internalization of
environment-oriented input in the phantom limb can occur: If ampu-
tees look at the stroking of someone else's arm, visual information is
transformed into haptic experiences upon one's corresponding phan-
tom limb (Ramachandran and Brang, 2009). This internalization of
environment-oriented input attenuates unpleasant sensations in the
phantom limb. ‘Alexithymia’ causes incoherence between emotional
state and feelings, for example when a person feels tears in his eyes,
without being able to trace these tears to sadness. Alexithymia and
concomitant hypochondria are associated with ‘somatosensory ampliﬁ-
cation’, a sensory process in which impact of (normal) sensations
increase due to preoccupation and concomitant reduction of self-
awareness (Mailloux and Brener, 2002; Nakao et al., 2002; Helling,
2009).
In healthy subjects, sensorymanipulation can bring forth perceptual
incoherence that results in profound alterations of self-experience in
healthy subjects (Blanke, 2012). Asymmetrical vestibular stimulation
can induce incoherent phenomena that can be reckoned among self-
disorders (depersonalisation, derealisation, disturbances of body own-
ership) and hallucinations (Schilder, 1933; Kolev, 1995; Sang et al.,
2006; Lopez et al., 2008; Cheyne and Girard, 2009). Experiences can
be induced of being touched on a rubber hand, of experience of touch
by alleged ‘supernatural causation’, or experience of alleged ‘body trans-
fer’ (Hohwy and Paton, 2010; Slater et al., 2010; Tsakiris, 2010; Tsakiris
et al., 2011; Bouchard et al., 2012).
7. Self-disorders
Self-disorders are pervasive and enduring anomalies of experienced
self. They are often present long before the ﬁrst psychotic episode and
may also occur in other disorders. Self-disorders can be predictive for
psychosis onset (Nelson et al., 2012), and occur in all following stages
of schizophrenia (Schultze-Lutter et al., 2010; Parnas et al., 2011). Related
concepts are ‘Abnormal Subjective Experiences’ (ASE) and ‘Basic Symp-
toms’ (BS) (Klosterkötter et al., 1997; Parnas et al., 2005; Schultze-
Lutter et al., 2010; Stanghellini and Ballerini, 2011; Stanghellini and
Fusar-Poli, 2012).
Self-disorders consist of two interdependent components: ‘dimin-
ished presence’ and ‘hyperreﬂexivity’ or ‘perplexity’.
‘Diminished presence’ is a phenomenological term for an alienating
experiential state in which a patient does not (entirely) feel vital or
present in this world (Sass and Parnas, 2003). Diminished presence
can be experienced in several ways: a sense of being dissolved or to
fall apart, a profound lack of identity, permeable or blurred boundaries
of the body, and not feeling related to own experiences or to the envi-
ronment. In the cognitive domain, ‘diminished presence’ can be re-
vealed as thoughts that seem to appear automatically, not to be
produced by one's self. The latter phenomena are usually accompanied
by profound ambivalence. In search for explanation these experiences
often lead to existential thoughts (Sass and Parnas, 2003; Parnas et al.,
2005, 2011; Stanghellini and Fusar-Poli, 2012; de Vries et al., 2013).
‘Hyperreﬂexivity’ or ‘perplexity’ is a puzzled state characterized by
hyper-alertmonitoring the qualitative changes of (inner) life. Inner pro-
cesses such as thinking, perceiving or moving that normally occur im-
plicitly without much conscious thought, now become tasks that need
to be guided and controlled in a mechanical way (Stanghellini, 2004).
This hyperreﬂexivity goes along with concomitant decline of usual
clearness in the ﬁeld of awareness (Raballo and Parnas, 2011). A
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periential changes in which front and background perceptions within
the ﬁeld of awareness have been exchanged (Stanghellini, 2004; de
Vries et al., 2013). The patient is attempting to accommodate this anom-
alous experience to existing schemas. This is reﬂected by frequent preoc-
cupations with philosophical, supernatural, and metaphysical feelings of
centrality or solipsism (Sass and Parnas, 2003).
8. Schizophrenia
Schizophrenia is often preceded by sub-delusional detachment from
reality that can be regarded as manifestation of self-disorders
(Schultze-Lutter et al., 2010; Parnas et al., 2011, Nelson et al., 2012) or
as perceptual incoherence. In schizophrenia, self-recognition and self-
other discrimination are impaired by defects in several multisensory
mechanisms: reduced recognition of the body, impaired emotion-
processing, abated authorship, disintegration of sensory input, and im-
paired source discrimination (Bender et al., 2007; Murata and Ishida,
2007; Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Roux et al., 2010). ‘Diminished presence’
may result from deﬁcits in somatosensory feedback, which undermine
the perceived sensory self (Table 1). Proprioception and tactile sensa-
tions are essential for sense of action and boundaries. Self-other discrim-
ination strongly depends on discrimination between internal and
external sensory inputs (Blakemore et al., 2000; Thakkar et al., 2011).
Reduced source discrimination (e.g. misattribution of own actions to
others) can be provoked by reduced boundary recognition (Tsakiris,
2010) due to reduced haptic sense or propriocepsis. Impaired self-
monitoring and source monitoring have been found to correlate with
auditory hallucinations, thought intrusion and alien control symptoms
(Blakemore et al., 2000; Chang and Lenzenweger, 2005; Ferchiou et al.,
2010; Synofzik et al., 2010; Waters and Badcock, 2010; Waters et al.,
2012; Gawęda et al., 2013). In sum, depending onwhich somatosensory
feedback is impaired, perceptual incoherencemay cause depersonaliza-
tion, blurred boundaries, cenesthopathies and/or diminished sense ofTable 3
Self-disorders consist of interrelated ‘diminished presence’ and ‘hyperreﬂexivity’; these phenom
tisensory impairmentsmay explain phenomenological experiences: diminished somatosensory
ampliﬁcation seems analogous to hyperreﬂexivity. The resultant sensory contextual loosen
hyperawareness to some background processes (as thinking, perceiving or moving) is coexiste
in a profound and ‘inexplicable’way.
Verbal expressions by patients Self-d
“Losing sense of being me, not being able to make sense of what happens to me,
being unable to connect with others, makes me feel inhumane”.
Dimi
Dimi
Self-a
“I think I am dissolving”. Bodil
“It felt as if it turned inside my head… when my eyes were directed at one point,
than I suffered least from this extra-terrestrial feeling”.
Cene
“I know it's my body and face, but it doesn't feel this way. It's scary”.
“The body does it, but I'm not in it”.
Soma
“I know they are my thoughts, but I do not feel they're mine”. Disto
Loss
“Some thoughts, I cannot decide whether they should be there”.
“Thinking went in too many directions in the same time. I couldn't decide what
to do, unless I was forced to”.
Hype
Thou
Ambi
“I could not go one direction, everything was even. I stayed in one big soup”.
“I felt like death, feelings were absent. I felt like in a mist, nothing had any
signiﬁcance”.
Amb
Mela
Dimi
Redu
“If people touch me, it seems like they come through my skin”.
“I saw a bird ﬂying. It ﬂew into my belly and made a nest in my spine”.
Dimi
Cene
He experienced that his thoughts ran onto his skull and even came out of his head
(like the box of Pandora). His thoughts bounced onto the ceiling. He knew that
this could not be true.
Hype
Thou
Spati
“It feels as if I'm only my legs”.
“My soul is in my heels, every step I take, I step on it”.
Morp
Psych
“I'm looking for arguments to make sense. Nothing has a meaning or purpose”. Lossownership and agency (Table 3). In all these manifestations diminished
self-perception is analogous to ‘diminished presence’ (Sass and Parnas,
2003; Cermolacce et al., 2007; Gallagher, 2005).
When hearing or vision is impaired, risk for schizophrenia is higher
(Butler and Javitt, 2005; Schubert et al., 2005; Schiffman et al., 2006;
Silverstein et al., 2006; Senkowski et al., 2007; Javitt, 2009; Chen,
2011; van der Werf et al., 2011; Silverstein et al., 2012). In schizophre-
nia (without evident impairment of hearing or vision), many audio–vi-
sual integration disturbances have been demonstrated. Congenital
blindness however, seems to protect against schizophrenia, though
not to mental illness in general. This protection is associated with com-
pensatory superior perceptual abilities of body-centred senses. These
ﬁndings strengthen the idea that disabled sensory integration or dimi-
nution of somatosensory feedback may undermine self-awareness in
schizophrenia.
Wewill focus further on vestibular sense and interoception. The ves-
tibular system is crucial formultisensory balance andmultisensory inte-
gration. Vestibular dysfunction, visuo-vestibular disintegration and
reduced functional connectivity between vestibular neural centres
have all been demonstrated in schizophrenia (Schilder, 1933; Fish and
Dixon, 1978; Gordon, 1979; Levy et al., 1983; Jones and Pivik, 1985;
Levy et al., 1994; Pawlak-Osińska et al., 2000; Haghgooie et al., 2009;
Chen, 2011). Caloric left vestibular nerve stimulation induced a short-
lived beneﬁcial effect on speciﬁc types of illness denial and delusions
in schizophrenia, and improved ownership of body parts in neurological
patients (Lopez et al., 2010; Levine et al., 2011).
Impairment of emotion-response may be regarded as one of the
manifestations of disturbed interoception in schizophrenia. Inadequacy
of affect in schizophrenia is associated with several phenomena, such
as: anticipatory pleasure deﬁcit, blunted responses to emotional stimuli,
and impaired expressiveness of facial musculature and emotion-
processing disturbances (Kring and Moran, 2008; Trémeau et al.,
2009; Dowd and Barch, 2010; Strauss, 2013). In schizophrenia,
alexithymia has been related to impaired interoception (Kubota et al.,ena show analogies to severalmultisensory integration deﬁcits. Sensory deﬁcits andmul-
feedback seemsanalogous to diminishedpresence, preoccupation-induced somatosensory
ing seems to go hand in hand with changes in the perceptual composition, in which
nt with a decline of the usual clearness in the ﬁeld of awareness. The experience changes
isorders Hypothetical sensory deﬁcit
nished self-presence
nished sense of basic self
lienation
Reduced interoception
y disintegration Waning ‘sensory self’. Haptic sense,
propriocepsis, interoception
sthopathies Vestibular dysfunction
tic depersonalization Reduced proprioception, interoception
rted ﬁrst-person perspective
of thought ipseity
Dissociation thoughts and interoception
rreﬂexivity
ght pressure
valence
Disintegration thought and interoception.
ivalence
ncholiform depersonalization
nished vitality
ced transparency of awareness
Reduced interoception leads to diminished
connection to inner and outer world
nished demarcation
sthetic experiences
Diminished haptic sense, propriocepsis,
interoception N reduced source
discrimination external/internal info
rreﬂexivity
ght pressure
alization of experience, concretisms
Reduced interoception leads to diminished
connection to thoughts
hological change
o-physical misﬁt
Somatosensory deﬁcit N body image or
perceived mind/soul/spirit is incongruent
with anatomical/biological characteristics
of common sense Loss of sensory context
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between central and autonomic system for processing signals of danger
(Williams et al., 2007), and dissociation between explicit and implicit
processing of prosody1 (Roux et al., 2010). An intriguing example is
the deﬁciency of autonomic responses in Capgras syndrome, which is
assumed to impair recognition of familiar faces and voices. This leads
to delusional beliefs that familiar persons are impostors (Lewis et al.,
2001; Ellis and Lewis, 2001). Pain perception is another manifestation
of interoception; its impairment is a notorious pitfall in somatic diag-
nostics in schizophrenia patients (Josephus Jitta, 2012; Potvin and
Marchand, 2008; Singh et al., 2006). The insula is a brain region where
interoception, and body-centred and environment-oriented input are
processed. In schizophrenia the insula shows neuro-anatomical and
functional abnormalities that correspond to disrupted interoception
processing (Wylie and Tregellas, 2010).9. Discussion
The idea that schizophrenia is associated with multisensory impair-
ments has been suggested earlier.Wepropose amodel inwhichpercep-
tual incoherence is linked with self-disorders in schizophrenia. The
mechanism described here is in concert with a meta-analysis of neuro-
psychological experiments in which Waters et al. (2012) concluded:
‘Self-recognition is impaired in patients with schizophrenia and particularly
those with auditory hallucinations. This suggests an association, perhaps
a causal one, between such deﬁcit and hallucinatory experiences in
schizophrenia’.
One of the reasons that bottom-up inﬂuences are still underrepre-
sented in scientiﬁc literature may be the implicit nature of sensory inte-
gration disturbances. The interplay between top-down and bottom-up
processes is however evident (Adcock et al., 2009; Silverstein et al.,
2012). Many mechanisms investigated from various perspectives, sup-
port our hypothesis: disturbances of neural synchrony and reduced
NMDA neurotransmission (Uhlhaas et al., 2008; Woo et al., 2010),
dysconnectivity and plasticity (Stephan et al., 2009), changes in brain
architecture involved in self-processes (Wylie and Tregellas, 2010;
Guo et al., 2012), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957; van
Veen et al., 2009), aberrant salience (Kapur, 2003), social defeat hypoth-
esis (Selten and Cantor-Grae, 2005), and psychodynamic theories in
which is surmised that psychosis can be explained as an attempt to re-
store the defective ‘self’ (Kohut and Wolfe, 1978; Schore, 2009).
Normal self-experience relies on a coherent percept. The human
brain regularly receives ambiguous sensory information and has capa-
bilities to resolve these situations (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Roach
et al., 2006). We argue that the disorder of the self in schizophrenia is
due to perceptual incoherence. Coping strategiesmay alleviate incoher-
ent sensory experiences on the expense of reality monitoring, and
thereby induce psychosis according to the following hypothesis:
Conﬂicting sensory input results in sensory ambivalence, expressed
in a qualitative change of experience of unknown origin. This state cap-
tivates attention. The object of focus is often aimed at internal processes
(thoughts, perceptions, feelings, actions). A preoccupied focus generally
leads to loosening of the focused object from its sensory context (i.e. dis-
integration) on the one hand, and causes sensory ampliﬁcation (i.e. in-
creased impact) on the other hand. This sensory ‘bootstrap’ can
change impact and salience of any thought or sensory detail. Simulta-
neously reduced attention for other meaningful events is analogous to
a decline of the ‘usual clearness of the ﬁeld of awareness’ (Raballo and
Parnas, 2011). Sensory imbalance obstructs integration of sensory
input to one uniﬁed percept. A perpetual circle of (focal) reduced
sensory input, hyper-focused attention, sensory ampliﬁcation and1 Prosody is implicit intonation–recognition, which is necessary for grasping the emo-
tional colour of language.subsequent disintegration might take hold of the experiential world.
In this circle reduced sensory input is analogous to ‘diminished pres-
ence’ and hyper-focused attention is analogous to ‘hyperreﬂexivity’ in
phenomenological terms. This results in diminished cohesion and an al-
tered composition between background and foreground sensory infor-
mation, which changes subjective experience in a profound and
‘inexplicable’ way (de Vries et al., 2013).
Two examples: perceptual incoherence emerges if interoception in a
certain situation is dissonantwith the predicted somatosensory pattern.
If one does not feel a pounding heartbeat in anxiety or thrill in enthusi-
asm, the ‘colour’ of experiences is qualitatively changed. Due to this
incoherence between the experience from the inner body and environ-
mental occurrences, emotions seem blunt, the surrounding world feels
strange, and self may even feel inhuman.
Similarly, thoughts with emotional impact deprived from predicted
interoception, create experienced distance to one's thoughts: thoughts
seem unfamiliar or automatic or seem not to be produced by oneself.
Apart from experienced alienation from one's thoughts, the vanished
inner sensory point of reference (Bermúdez, 2000), results in a
compromised inner dialogue in which it seems as if the ‘I’ is not
involved. This prevents adopting a clear position: opposing ideas and
intentions seem to interrupt each other, and generate crippling ambiv-
alence. Intense reﬂection about chaotic thought-processes might in-
crease their impact and bring further dissociation between thoughts
and their emotional contents. This is how incoherence between
thoughts and interoception might contribute to an experience of being
‘disembodied’. Concomitant sensations e.g. caused by stress (twitches,
headaches etc.) may increase to strange experiences such as buzzing
sensations or a feeling as if the head will explode. If these sensations
cannot be linked to stress, but instead are integrated with the changed
quality of thought-content, thismight lead to concretization of thoughts
(Table 3).
Furthermore, if experiences are deprived of aligning somatosensory
feedback, then engagement in thinking and activities will increase per-
ceptual incoherence, which might result in avoidance. Avoidance may
be effective in the short term, but increases inner absorption, ultimately
leading to further distance between inner and outer world. This sensory
mechanism can explain reduced feelings of purpose, disorganisation, re-
treat into one's inner world, avolition, a sense of misalignment or dis-
connection between mind and physical ‘self’.
Uncanny sensory experiences might lead to ‘unintelligible’ behav-
ioural changes, aimed to increase feelings of safety (even before reality
monitoring has been overthrown): avoiding direct eye-contact,
protecting the body's boundaries, closing the curtains, using cannabis,
or demanding medical investigations.
Any somatosensory deﬁcit resulting in perceptual incoherence may
function as a ‘sensory vacuum’ in the sensory self. To resolve perceptual
incoherence, the brain can create experiences (imagination) or retrieve
sensory surrogates from other mental domains (memories or thoughts
that do occurwith pertained emotions) and ﬁll the sensory vacuum. For
example, diminished somatosensory feedback results in diminished
self-recognition expressed in a sinister feeling that ‘something’ is
wrong. In search for explanations, subsequent preoccupation results in
sensory ampliﬁcation of normal background sensations to extra-
ordinary proportions. Some become preoccupied with the idea of an
imaginary disease, others might become anxious about environmental
threats or seek refuge in magical ideation. Top-down enhanced sensa-
tions or retrieved sensations from other mental domains (dreams,
imagination, memory, internalization) may then ﬁll the sensory vacu-
um. A relief caused by attenuation of perceptual incoherence might
cause an intuitive feeling as if these explanations ‘ﬁt’ and create a
ﬁxed sense of reality, such as a caricatured body image, personal threat,
or some prophecy. Thus, sensory congruence will be restored at the
expense of diminished reality monitoring. From this perspective, delu-
sions and hallucinations can be regarded as a ‘solution’ for incompre-
hensible, incoherent multisensory experiences.
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Somatosensory feedback is a fundamental mechanism to important
aspects underlying self-recognition such as sensory–motor prediction,
imagination and memory. Impaired somatosensory feedback may lead
to perceptual incoherence. ‘Perceptual incoherence’ is analogous to in-
coherent self-experiences described as ‘self-disorders’ by Sass and
Parnas, the ‘loosening of associations’ between thoughts, feelings and
actions described by Bleuler, or ‘loss of self-evidence’ described by
Blankenburg. These authors regarded self-disorders as the core deﬁcit
in schizophrenia. Multisensory strategies intended to repair perceptual
incoherence, may lead to impaired source monitoring and positive
symptoms. Here we discussed a sensory model in which positive
symptomsmay result from coping strategies in order to soothe alienat-
ing self-experiences. The pattern of multisensory integration or co-
weighting of body-centred and environment-oriented input during
body-perception in schizophrenia warrants further investigation.
More insight in multisensory mechanisms may increase our under-
standing of psychopathogenesis of schizophrenia. A better under-
standing of perceptual incoherence and self-disorders as disturbing,
incoherent perceptions that cause suffering and decline of functioning,
may improve recognition of high-risk individuals. Differentiation of
ultra-high-risk groups may improve recognition of early stages of
schizophrenia. The perceptual incoherence hypothesis may offer to pa-
tients a plausible explanation for self-disorders. Such explanations
might prevent patients' search for existential clariﬁcations or formation
of delusions. Some patients may realise that their coping strategies ag-
gravate perceptual incoherence. Complementary sensory therapies
may diminish perceptual incoherence and thereby alleviate incoherent
self-experiences.
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